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[TheWindCriesMary]

I do believe that even with all the supplies, the sherman still cost more than 5 times less than the panther. Don't quote me on that, but I remember the Sherman cost 39 thousand dollars to make, while the panther over 300.000.
Elite Tank Crews? Sure - losing them isn't the best thing to do, but I would guess it's still mostly the rookies getting blown to smithereens.

 The panther didnt even cost close to 5 times more than a sherman.

 First of all, the cost of a panther was measured in Reichsmarks, which Germany already had trading at very complimentary rates with the rest of European currency. On top of that, as was mentioned above this was a dictatorship which meant German industries, while being compensated, were not expected to make a profit beyond what their government contacts and relationships could secure for them.

 And on top of that, the Rechsimark was trading with American currency at a rate of 1:4 in 1938. This ratio did not fluctuate much by 1944, and since a Panther (by conservative estimates) cost just over 200, 000 reichmarks to manufacture (300 000 at the top end of estimates)  either figure still only equates the panther to being between 30, 000 - 70, 000 US dollars each.

 Thats the beauty of a dictatorship, and 6 years of tank manufacturing experience from an industry for you. They could pump out heavier, larger tanks for a comparable cost.

 2x more than a sherman (or 1 1/2 if you go with the conservative estimate) is the most you can rationally conclude.

 -Wind

[Mgallun74]

I do believe that even with all the supplies, the sherman still cost more than 5 times less than the panther. Don't quote me on that, but I remember the Sherman cost 39 thousand dollars to make, while the panther over 300.000.
Elite Tank Crews? Sure - losing them isn't the best thing to do, but I would guess it's still mostly the rookies getting blown to smithereens.

 The panther didnt even cost close to 5 times more than a sherman.

 First of all, the cost of a panther was measured in Reichsmarks, which Germany already had trading at very complimentary rates with the rest of European currency. On top of that, as was mentioned above this was a dictatorship which meant German industries, while being compensated, were not expected to make a profit beyond what their government contacts and relationships could secure for them.

 And on top of that, the Rechsimark was trading with American currency at a rate of 1:4 in 1938. This ratio did not fluctuate much by 1944, and since a Panther (by conservative estimates) cost just over 200, 000 reichmarks to manufacture (300 000 at the top end of estimates)  either figure still only equates the panther to being between 30, 000 - 70, 000 US dollars each.

 Thats the beauty of a dictatorship, and 6 years of tank manufacturing experience from an industry for you. They could pump out heavier, larger tanks for a comparable cost.

 2, or 2 1/2 times more than a sherman (or 1 1/2 if you go with the conservative estimate) is the most you can rationally conclude.

 -Wind

well, that would match up well with our pricing here in eirr.. lol.

[Mysthalin]

Cheerio, I wasn't really sure about the numbers.

[TheWindCriesMary]

Cheerio, I wasn't really sure about the numbers.

 Neither was I to be honest. Your post made me do some digging, and I was surprised to find how cheap Panthers really were. (I also assumed they would be vastly more expensive than a panther).

 Interesting stuff.

 -Wind

[Malevolence]

Panther was created as a counter of T34 for eastern front.
Panther has same weapon, same armor level (mm and angle of armor plates), much better optics (german optics was the best in WW2, that allow german tank aces destroy rus and us tanks from up to 2000m).

Yes, it was based on the T-34, but almost all aspects of it were upgraded. The optics were better than the T-34 (but worse than those the Americans and British used, the Americans even had gyroscopic stabilizers on their guns for crying out loud, though they tended to turn them off because they were too maintenance intensive), the weapon was better than what the T-34 had at the time (75mm in a much longer barrel for better accuracy and muzzle speed as opposed to the shorter 75 on the T-34, the T-34/85's gun was comparable due to bore size and elongation but the Panther's gun was still massively long), a quick check of wiki disproves your "same armor level" statement, and it's also known that the Americans had the best fire control systems of the war. The German weapons could shoot (and kill) to 2 kilometers, sure, but their optics did not allow for reliable hits at anywhere near this range.

But T34 was equiped with compact powerfull diesel engine, while panther constructors put in their tank gasoline engine Maybach and electric transmission, which make a tank just higher and heavy (diesel engine has much more power-to-weight ratio). So Germans take a concept of T34, but because of fuel deficiency they use gasoline Maybach (they have sintetic gasolin not oil to produce diesel fuel) and get medium tank with heavy weight.

Could be, though honestly I'd assume the steel plates being almost twice as thick as those on the T-34 would increase weight more than the engine.

M4 Sherman was really not best choise (easy to produce and cheap), but US loose the time and was behind USSR and Germany for 3-5 years of tank industry tecnologies, their only chanse was to produse as much as they can. Fact that US develop tank, which can hold the line with 5-years exspirienced german military and science is a real triumph. In tank battles in 44-45 for 1 destroyed Panther  US pay 5 shermans (statistic).

Arracourt statistics show that it was much closer to 1-1, with the defender having the advantage. The US tank had the larger advantage while defending because their optics allowed their initial shot to be well ranged and targeted compared the German optics, this is the reason that the US armor defending a position did better than German armor tended to, but regardless on the whole it depends heavily on who is attacking whom.

Five tanks for one is a good idea if you have to attack. You will probably lose one tank to the first round, then maybe another tank returning fire if the defender is good, leaving you with a 3-1 ratio for the remaining face to face battle ensuring victory. Five to one was always the preferred odds for attacking an entrenched position, armored or otherwise.

That why all allied soldiers in west front was afraid of wehrmacht panzer and mechanized divisions.
For example Panther go to attack at the average 11 times (USSR 3 times, US - 5 times) thanks to design.

P.S. yes, im a military historian with diploma

P.S. You may wish to ask for your money back.

Sounds very unlikely, as the Sherman was known to catch fire at the first shot and the T-34 is revolutionary because of its sloping armor (which the Germans copied with the Panther). Got a source ?

Sloped armor (which the Sherman also possessed and you seem to forget) has no correlation with defeating an engine fire or ammunition cook-off. This is achieved by fire suppression systems and wet ammunition storage, both of which the Americans pioneered.

As for a source, I'm afraid I only have history-buff friends of mine quoting books I don't own nor have access to, nor indeed remember the names of. If you want something more concrete I'm afraid I don't have it at the moment, though I could ask if you'd really like to know.

german industry and infrastructure was destroyed by heavy strategic bombing, at the and of 44 most german dividions was out of supplies.

German industrial output increased through the middle of 1944 in spite of allied bombing raids. Only by the end of 1944 did their industrial output actually have an annual decrease, and this could be just as much due to the seizing of wide swathes of territory the year prior as the bombing.

These are the reasons, as we both said, that this tank was succesful (rather than firepower/armor where it was mediocre at best compared to the medium tanks of the Soviets/Germans.

Of course, refitting the Sherman with things like the 17 lber gun made it as lethal at any range as any German tank bar the King Tiger, and with those very nice optics the Western allies had, they were a real fear for Panzers just as the Tiger was for the Allies. Michael Wittman was said to prioritize anti-tank guns and Fireflies ahead of all other tanks, and he should know what he was doing. He was, after all, Michael Wittman.



As to the stories of Hellcats' success, Gamesguy revelled me with a tale of the heroics of two Hellcats who, together through the power of friendship or something equally unbelievable, were able to stall an entire panzer division for several days. Or something like that. Hellcats were the very definition of "shoot and scoot" and weren't terribly bad at it, either.

and dont forget, that US army buy shermans from US military companies, but wehrmaht just got because of dictatorship (payfree labour VS free market )

A point I think you will find interesting is that the first run of Shermans by Chrysler actually came in ahead of schedule AND under budget, and they promptly refunded the additional cash to the government. The government paid strictly for parts and labor during WW2, and not a penny more. The German government had to do the same.

*snip money*

Which is why measuring it in total man hours to completion under a total war scenario, assuming no scarcities of material, is a much surer method.

The Panzer IV took roughly 90,000 man-hours to complete, the Panther 156,000 and the Tiger a whopping 300,000. Compared to the T-34 in 1943 with a total man hour time of 18,000 hours and by the end of the war in 1945 a mere 3,251 man-hours... the German tanks were seriously up shit creek. I have no actual numbers on the Sherman, but given what the Russians did with the T-34 and how supremely the US could streamline building efficiency (we were known during the war to cut 50% costs and 25% manufacturing time, or 50%+ manufacturing time even, off of guns previously manufactured by European companies once given the design). Point is, Germans sucked at assembly line no matter what kind of monetary system they were using.


The Panther, compared to the P4, really isn't very expensive. It's something like 10-20% more cost for what must be 50% more tank, but even so its man hours to build go up significantly, limiting Germany in the extreme.


More detail later, spring break starting gotta move stuff.

[RedDevilNarref]

I don't think man-hour is a good indicator to compare tanks desings, especially between different economic regimes.

[gamesguy2]

2TheWindCriesMary
M4 Sherman was really not best choise (easy to produce and cheap), but US loose the time and was behind USSR and Germany for 3-5 years of tank industry tecnologies, their only chanse was to produse as much as they can. Fact that US develop tank, which can hold the line with 5-years exspirienced german military and science is a real triumph. In tank battles in 44-45 for 1 destroyed Panther  US pay 5 shermans (statistic). That why all allied soldiers in west front was afraid of wehrmacht panzer and mechanized divisions.

Bullcrap.  Actual statistics complied after the war showed that when shermans engaged panthers the actual ratio was 1.2 panthers killed for every sherman lost.    

Here is month end result the battle of arracourt, second biggest tank battle of the war, fought between the 4th armored division equipped with mostly 75mm shermans and M10s with no air support due to heavy fog vs the 5th panzer army:

Of the 262 tanks and assault guns deployed by the German units in the week of fighting near Arracourt, 86 were destroyed, 114 were damaged or broken down, and only 62 were operational at the end of the month. The 4th Armored Division, which had borne the brunt of the Arracourt tank fighting, lost 41 M4 medium tanks and 7 M5A1 light tanks during the whole month of September, and casualties had been 225 killed and 648 wounded.

Here is a specific engagement within the battle:

For 3 days Colonel Clark's CCA was behind enemy lines. The 37th Tank Battalion spent those days spreading confusion and terror in the German rear areas. From 19 September through 22 September 1944, the Germans tried to push the 37th Tank Battalion back across the Moselle. It was one of the largest tank-to-tank engagements of the war, at Mayenvie, the 37th Tank Battalion lost 14 Shermans while knocking out 55 Panthers and Tigers. Needless to say, the German counterattack was unsuccessful.

On 22 September 1944, the 37th Tank Battalion's M4s swept south again through Coincourt and Bures to the Rhine-Marne Canal. Counterattack followed counterattack as the desperate Wehrmacht tried to dislodge the Third US Army from its position, but as the toll of Panthers mounted, the attacks dwindled in intensity and finally ceased. The 37th Tank Battalion was relieved on 12 October 1944 by elements of the 26th "Yankee" Infantry Division. For its tenacity in the Moselle Valley, the 37th Tank Battalion was awarded its second Croix de Guerre with Palm by a grateful French Government (it's first having come in Normandy). The 37th's tankers were pulled off line for a rest after 87 straight days of combat.

The picture is clear.  When the Americans were the ones doing the defending for once(very rare), 4:1 kill ratios in favor of the humble sherman was the norm.    But even when the Americans were attacking, outside of the initial landings at Normandy the Sherman still achieved a positive kill ratio against German armor.

The Sherman was simply better.

Here's a Department of War analysis of the sherman vs the panther during WWII:

US Army's Ballistics Research Laboratory conducted a study of tank vs tank engagements fought by the 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions from August to December 1944.

98 engagements were identified, including 33 from the Ardennes fighting. The typical engagement involved 9 US Shermans against 4 German AFVs. Only 1/3 of the total involved more then 3 German AFVs. The average range Shermans inflicted kills on the panzers was 893yds, and the panzers averaged kills at 946yds.

The study concluded that the most important factor was spotting and shooting first. Defenders fired first 84% of all engagement, inflicting 4.3 times more casualties on the attackers then suffered. When the attackers fired first, they inflicted 3.6 times as many casualties on the defenders compared to own losses.

29 engagements involved Panthers and Shermans. The Shermans had an average numerical advantage of 1.2:1. The data showed the Panther was 1.1 times as effective as the Sherman in defense, but the Sherman was a whopping 8.4 times more effective then the Panther when on the defense. Overall, the Sherman was 3.6 times as effective as the Panther in all engagements.

At the end of the 2 weeks of fighting in the Ardennes, the Panther regiments had lost 180 tanks, or about 43% of the starting forces. Of the 235 survivors, only 45% were operational, with the remainder dead-lined due to mechanical problems or battle-damage.

The First US Army had lost 320 Shermans by the end of December (90 were 76mm tanks) about 25% of it's average daily strength. Due to reinforcements, First Army ended December with 1,085 Shermans on hand, 980 operational and 9% deadlined due to mechanical problems or damage.

3rd Armored fought 14 engagements before Ardennes, and 17 after. 4th Armored fought 34 actions from 19 Sept to 6 December.

According to Table II, the most common type of engagement was Shermans defending against Panthers, and the Shermans fired first. in 19 engagements, involving 104 Shermans and 93 Panthers, 5 Shermans were destroyed compared to 57 Panthers.

The second most common engagement was US Tank destroyers defending against Panthers, with the TDs firing first. In 11 engagements, involving 61 TDs and 19 Panthers, 1 TD was lost compared to all 19 Panthers.

The most successful enemy weapon was antitank guns defending. In 9 engagements (3rd most common), 19 a/t guns inflicted 25 casualties on 104 total attacking Shermans, losing 3 guns in exchange.

The 4th most common engagement was Shermans attacking Panthers, and the Shermans fired first. In 5 actions a total of 41 Shermans fought 17 Panthers, losing 2 and taking 12 Panthers in return.

One table gives the average ranges for 6 areas of battle. The one with the longest average range of allied casualties, Arracourt, 1260yds, also had the most German casualties by far, 74, more then twice the next most Germans losses at Sarre (35) with an average range of 1116 yds for each allied kill. The least number of Germans casualties came with the shortest average distance to allied tank losses, 476 yds. No German tanks were lost against 26 allied tanks at Stollberg.

Yes, contrary to popular belief, a wide open field is not in favor of the heavily armed and armored German tanks.   Their optics were so poor compared to the American counterparts that Shermans would often get the first and second shot before the Germans could even get off a single shot.   German tanks were actually better defending a narrow chokepoint where their slow turret rotation and poor optics were less of a factor and the American advantage in mobility and optics were negated.

Overall, the sherman tank was much superior to a panther.

For example Panther go to attack at the average 11 times (USSR 3 times, US - 5 times) thanks to design.

P.S. yes, im a military historian with diploma

You should ask for your money back.

As to the stories of Hellcats' success, Gamesguy revelled me with a tale of the heroics of two Hellcats who, together through the power of friendship or something equally unbelievable, were able to stall an entire panzer division for several days. Or something like that. Hellcats were the very definition of "shoot and scoot" and weren't terribly bad at it, either.

It was actually four hellcats.   They literally raced past the German division, reaching the German objective ahead of the Germans despite starting later and from further away.

Then those four hellcats attacked an entire panzer division and destroyed around 30-40 panthers and tigers without a single loss.   This attack stalled the German division's attack long enough for reinforcements to arrive.

People like to talk about Wittman, but he had firepower and armor on his side.  The hellcats had paper thin armor that could barely deflect a machine gun bullet and they still destroyed a ridiculous number of enemies using far heavier and more expensive tanks.

Which takes more skill?  Sitting on a road shooting up cromwells driving down a road while all their shots bounce off your armor like a turkey shoot or desperately manuevering and flanking to dodge the return fire from an entire panzer division(any of which, if it hit you, would destroy your tank) and still achieve the same ridiculous kill ratio?

[Tymathee]

very  nice games guy, so coh is a full on farce eh? so panther should have huge wind up like the m-10, slow turret rotation like the tiger and not be as accurate eh? and the sherman should be very accurate and have very good turret rotation?

[TheWindCriesMary]

 Good post Gamesguy, and I definetely agree with you about the hellcat anecdote. It just goes to show that mobility, and strategy trumps big fat heavy tanks even when they are in large numbers.

 However some context to the Arracourt information:

 Through September and October, a series of new Panzer-Brigades equipped with Panther tanks were sent into France to try to stop the Allied advance with counterattacks.[77] This culminated in the Battle of Arracourt (September 18–29, 1944), in which the mostly Panther-equipped German forces suffered heavy losses fighting against the 4th Armored Division of Patton's 3rd Army, which were still primarily equipped with 75 mm M4 Sherman tanks and yet came away from the battle with only a few losses. The Panther units were newly formed, poorly trained, and tactically disorganized; most units ended up stumbling into ambush situations against seasoned U.S. tank crews.

 So while the battle of Arracourt definetely showed the german Panzer divisions (comprised largely of Panthers) were outperformed heavily by the shermans, this does not show that the Panther as a tank itself was not superior (which numerous sources have frequently considered it to be one of the best tanks of the war).

 Instead it shows that there are far more factors that determine how a tank performs beyond thick its armor is, or how large it's gun. This includes tank crew experience, and terrain. Time and time again the Panther proved to be dominant in open fields, yet woefully unready for close-city fighting.

 To quote Gen. Fritz Bayerlein who commanded the PanzerLehr:

    

While the PzKpfw IV could still be used to advantage, the PzKpfw V [Panther] proved ill adapted to the terrain. The Sherman because of its maneuverability and height was good...[the Panther was] poorly suited for hedgerow terrain because of its width. Long gun barrel and width of tank reduce maneuverability in village and forest fighting. It is very front-heavy and therefore quickly wears out the front final drives, made of low-grade steel. High silhouette. Very sensitive power-train requiring well-trained drivers. Weak side armor; tank top vulnerable to fighter-bombers. Fuel lines of porous material that allow gasoline fumes to escape into the tank interior causing a grave fire hazard. Absence of vision slits makes defense against close attack impossible.

 
 -Wind

[acker]

I really do not understand which sources you cite when calling said tank a "medium" tank. Certainly it cannot be Ambrose (for obvious pro-American reasons). Nor can it be Hastings (who is quite neutral) or even Dupuy (who quantifies tanks for his QJM by tonnage, firepower, and other factors, not by classification, in order to get around this problem). Indeed, pretty much every author I know makes it explicit that the Axis considered the Panther a medium tank, and the Allies considered it a heavy tank...or simply ignores the discrepancy altogether in favor of tonnage and gun.

Indeed, pretty much every historical authority on WWII makes it clear that tank classification is a relative process. This is most readily seen in Sino-Japanese war accounts (and the Russian Manchurian offensive) by Western sources.

I have not read much on the Eastern Front. Nor have I read Jentz. Perhaps those authors make a claim about the Panther/Sherman discrepancy that I do not know of.

I do not know about early 1945 onwards (which would have included the introduction of the Pershing in a relatively short amount of time, further confusing tank references), but I do know that engagements around the Lorraine in September of 1944 tend to treat Panthers as heavies, not mediums. This is most directly evidenced by the methodology used by the Allies to deal with the German Tiger/Panther tanks at Arracourt; Artillery and 90mm TD fire at distances, combined with Sherman flanks w/mobile scouts at closer ranges*. This is not representative of a way to deal with medium tanks (which was generally more...straightforward). This is a methodology to deal with heavies. Similar methodologies were first utilized by Germany in France and Russia, 1940-41, to deal with "heavy" (relative to the time, of course) tanks.

I do not know what you consider short-lived. But the Allies did not classify the Axis Panthers as mediums in early 1944, to say the least.


Crap...Too many pages have gone by. This might take most of the evening, a moment.

*Distance is, of course, relative to conditions and spotting.

[acker]

I would disagree with TheWindCriesMary on his analysis about open fields and Panthers, simply because most tank battles do not merely take place between only tanks. Open fields tended to be actively avoided by German tank crews in any protracted battle, simply because Allied tank divisions packed much, much more vehicle towed/self-propelled guns/Air support than their Axis counterparts.

...Of course, the alternative was unpleasant, but was preferable. This is best evidenced by German planning in the Ardennes Offensive, deliberately giving up LOS for fog, snow, and clouds. German Panther in long range tended to work better in 1943-44 Russia, due to Russian inflexibility concerning CAS/Artillery. Though, of course, Russia eventually got heavier tanks...

Reason:

Tank casualties by tank fire on both sides are actually fairly uncommon (between 20%-30% of all knockouts). Artillery, AT guns, and mines tend to make up the lion's share of tank kills (over 50%). Indeed, in the German invasion at Barbarossa, artillery, by itself, knocked out over half of the Russian tanks.

The intrinsic value of a tank, due to its combined arms limitations, must be considered in the context of the Tank Division/Battalion as a whole.

this does not show that the Panther as a tank itself was not superior (which numerous sources have frequently considered it to be one of the best tanks of the war).

I don't want to argue about Arracourt (to be honest, I don't know too much about that), and some sources list the Panther as one of the best tanks of the war. However, a cursory inspection of German Division logistics in 1943, 44, and 45 shows some fairly startling numbers.

In 1943, no Panther A unit was EVER able sustain a 35% operational rate. Five percent of Panther transmissions broke within 100 kilometers of wear/tear. 95% of transmission within 1,500 km of use. The final drive for the Panther D had extreme difficulties simply turning the tank while it backed up (as in, the "catastrophic failure" type of difficulty). SS-Leibstandarte in Italy received Panther tanks in 1943: EVERY SINGLE ONE was rejected for service.

Panther G was certainly an improvement, but was still pretty terrible. The transmission had a service life of 150 km (tested by the French after the war), not 100 km. Suspension was terribly overstressed, and the third gear tended to strip extremely quickly. The single tooth spur gears tended to wear out just as quickly. 1944; "only" 35-40% of them were "unavailable". That's terrible.

It bears notice that, of the Panther tanks brought to Britain for post-war testing, 90% of them caught on fire when turned on. There's a reason why every Panther tank came with a fire extinguisher; every Panther model had problems with "ignition", no pun intended. Something to do with fuel backflow when the tank stopped, requiring one to stall them in gear...whatever that means, I'm no automobile junkie.


...And, of course, the Panther tank took around 150,000 man-hours to make, per tank. The Sherman took 4000-5000.

[TheWindCriesMary]

 Acker I've listed some sources that I've consulted below. Interestingly enough, this discussion has led me to find many, many sources that call it three different things: medium, "heavy medium", and "heavy". To date most have used the medium classification however, which fits with the numbers, and combat role the tank served.

 A few credible sources to help illuminate any confusion would probably help, so I've provided a few.

 The first are from a book by John D Buckley called "british armour in the Normandy Campaign, 1944"

http://books.google.ca/books?id=OaKMl8QFSA8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false

1 Page 118


2 139

3 154

 And then we have the World War 2 Databse:

http://ww2db.com/vehicle_spec.php?q=246

 And then we have a less accreddited databse of WW2 weaponry and vehicles using the curious "heavy" medium tank:

 

http://ww2total.com/WW2/Weapons/Vehicles/Tanks/German/Panzer-V-Panther/Panther-tank.htm

 And as an  aside to the side discussion that German tank-v-tank superiority was non-existenct, the following is an excerpt from the Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945 to theSecretary of War (note this is only a comparison of individual tank abillity comparisons):

 

From the summer of 1943 to the spring of 1945 the German Tiger and Panther tanks outmatched our Sherman tanks in direct combat. This stemmed largely from different concepts of armored warfare held by us and the Germans, and the radical difference in our approach to the battlefield. Our tanks had to be shipped thousands of miles overseas and landed on hostile shores amphibiously. They had to be able to cross innumerable rivers on temporary bridges, since when we attacked we sought to destroy the permanent bridges behind the enemy lines form the air. Those that our planes missed were destroyed by the enemy when he retreated. Therefore our tanks could not well be of the heavy type. We designed our armor as a weapon of exploitation. In other words, we desired to use our tanks in long-range thrusts deep into the enemy's rear where they could chew up his supply installations and communications. This required great endurance--low consumption of gasoline and ability to move great distances without break-down.

 It is interesting to note that the Chief of Staff regarded Panthers and Tigers as heavy tanks. I've included this note to show the discrepency between it's classification.

 It also important to remember the quote I supplied earlier from Fritz Bayerlein who commanded the PanzerLehr division:

While the PzKpfw IV could still be used to advantage, the PzKpfw V [Panther] proved ill adapted to the terrain. The Sherman because of its maneuverability and height was good...[the Panther was] poorly suited for hedgerow terrain because of its width. Long gun barrel and width of tank reduce maneuverability in village and forest fighting. It is very front-heavy and therefore quickly wears out the front final drives, made of low-grade steel. High silhouette. Very sensitive power-train requiring well-trained drivers. Weak side armor; tank top vulnerable to fighter-bombers. Fuel lines of porous material that allow gasoline fumes to escape into the tank interior causing a grave fire hazard. Absence of vision slits makes defense against close attack impossible.

 As we can see, highly qualified commentators from both the Americans and the German war machine had equal misgivings about the tanks in their command. The Americans seemed to have consistently commisierated that their tanks needed heavier guns and thicker armour (resulting in pershings and upgunned shermans becoming essential and occupying the vast majority of new tanks shipped overseas), while the German commanders seemed to admire (and fear) the mobility, mechanical reliability, and numerical advantage of the american Tanks.

 Pretty interesting, as an insight into power vs versatility and production.
 

 -Wind

[acker]

Interesting...I've never read Buckley before. Thanks for the information.

It does bear note that Buckley refers to tonnage before calling the Panther a "medium" tank, however. His classification system does seem to be based around "role" rather than "response".

I tend to read the more publicized accounts of WWII (publicized as in widely-reviewed, not as in uncriticized*, I'm making no claims of elitism). Perhaps that has something to do with it. And, be it as it may, it's certainly true that the Western Allies responded to and, in turn, treated, the Panther as a heavy tank, not as a medium, well into 1944.

As we can see, highly qualified commentators from both the Americans and the German war machine had equal misgivings about the tanks in their command. The Americans seemed to have consistently commisierated that their tanks needed heavier guns and thicker armour (resulting in pershings and upgunned shermans becoming essential and occupying the vast majority of new tanks shipped overseas), while the German commanders seemed to admire (and fear) the mobility, mechanical reliability, and numerical advantage of the american Tanks.

 Pretty interesting, as an insight into power vs versatility and production.

 -Wind

Of course; the commander who doesn't wish the best and the impossible for his soldiers is not fit for command. The question is, however, who was more correct about their misgivings.

Judging from the results, Allied fears were much less justified than the Axis ones. The Sherman fit into Allied Divisions far better than the Panther fit into German Divisions.

*I, for one, have a few problems with Dupuy's equations for his QJM (they're somewhat off for precise scenarios), but, hey, the US Army uses them for combat simulations. And his historical data-gathering is unparalleled.

[EscforrealityTLS]

This is a fantastic discussion, extremely entertaining and informative.

Please do keep it up everyone.

Escape.

[acker]

We need a WWII book thread.

No, seriously, we really do.

[Mgallun74]

Hellcats for the win... seems the name hellcat in ww2 lead you to legendary status.. the TD and Fighter.


--

wasnt it m18s and not m10s at that time?


---Killer344: Please don't quote multiple posts at once 

[Demon767]

Gamesguy. what is not accounted for is the terrain. defensive positions etc. height and depth. Morale. Fatigue. Tank crew experience.

There are so many factors of change that are not held accountable in war reports. in Saying that. quoting sources of information to prove your theory of what tank was better K/D  wise cannot be proven.

Let me give you an example

ON PAPER

The 75 mm M4 gun could not penetrate the Panther from the front at all, although it could penetrate various parts of the Panther from the side at ranges from 400 to 2,600 m (440 to 2,800 yd). The 76 mm gun could also not penetrate the front hull armor of the Panther, but could penetrate the Panther turret mantlet at very close range.[97] In August 1944, the HVAP (high velocity armor-piercing) 76 mm round was introduced to improve the performance of the 76 mm M4 Shermans. With a tungsten core, this round could still not penetrate the Panther glacis plate, but could punch through the Panther mantlet at 800 to 1,000 yd (730 to 910 m), instead of the usual 100 yards for the normal 76 mm round. However, tungsten production shortages meant that this round was always in short supply, with only a few rounds available per tank, and some M4 Sherman units never received any.

and the Panther Penetration Values

APCR

    *
          o Panzergranate 40 (Hk) (Pzgr. 40/42)
          o Type: Armor Piercing Composite Rigid, tungsten core
          o Projectile weight: 4.75 kg
          o Round weight: 11.55 kg
          o Round length: 875.2 mm
          o Cartridge case length: 640 mm
          o Muzzle velocity: 1120 m/s
          o Average penetration performance established against rolled homogenous steel armor plate laid back at 30° from the vertical[6]
          o 100 m: 194 mm
          o 500 m: 174 mm
          o 1000 m: 149 mm
          o 1500 m: 127 mm
          o 2000 m: 106 mm

Ok, now lets look at the M36 Jackson 90mm

The 90 mm M36 tank destroyer was introduced in September 1944; the 90 mm round also proved to have difficulty penetrating the Panther's glacis plate, and it was not until an HVAP version of the round was developed that it could effectively penetrate it from combat range. It was very effective against the Panther's front turret and from the side, however.

Now just because the M36 Jackson with HVAP can reliably penetrate the frontal armor of the Panther, does not mean that the Panther is worse. as the Panther can also penetrate the M36 at normal combat Ranges.

Its all about positioning in War. a Sherman can reliably penetrate a Panther on the side. A panther can also penetrate a sherman from the side. War reports on K/D ratio cannot prove what tank is better

IMO.

[Akranadas]

Hey guys, can you go easy on the quoting?

[acker]

Without going into the stuff directly addressed at Gamesguy...

At least part of the above data is disingenuous. German APCR production was always very limited due to a certain Krupp monopoly on tungsten ore. German APCR production ceased altogether in 1943, with anywhere from all to nearly all of the tungsten ammo being melted for industrial purposes.

APCR availability makes HVAP availability look quite bountiful in comparison...and, unlike APCR, HVAP availability grew as the war went on. The average US 76mm Tanker got 2 HVAP rounds (Tank Destroyers got significantly more). A LUCKY German tanker might OCCASIONALLY have (not get) 1 or 2 APCR rounds...if he served on the Eastern Front.

This is the penetration table for APCBC, L70, against 30-degree RHA:

138, 124, 111, 99, 89

At 100, 500, 1k, 1.5k, and 2k meters respectively.

This is the penetration table for the 90mm M3 gun (APCBC), against similar armor:

129, 122, 114, 106

At 457, 914, 1,371, and 1,828 meters respectively. HVAP is hardly necessary.

This is the HVAP table for the 90mm M3 gun:

221, 199, 176, 156

At 457, 914, 1,371, and 1,828 meters respectively. This is overkill.


http://www.freeweb.hu/gva/weapons/german_guns5.html
http://gva.freeweb.hu/weapons/usa_guns7.html
http://www.freeweb.hu/gva/weapons/germany.html#index

What's good for the goose is good for the gander; if you're going to quote AP tables, do so for both sides. Though, I must say, it's nearly irrelevant to the Sherman and the Panther.

[Demon767]

why would i care to quote both sides tables. the above quote is good enough. i cant care less for all the nitty gritty.

Do you think Panthers Shot HE rounds at Enemy tanks? APCR/AP rounds w/e i dont care. bottom line is they all penetrate